







### **HoneySpider Network**

### Fighting client side threats

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### Goals

- Introduction honeyclients & malicious servers
- Technical ins and outs HoneySpider Network







### **Outline**

- Honeyclients
- Malicious servers
- HoneySpider Network Why ?
- Project status
- Technical concept
- Wrap up









# What is a Honeyclient? (I)



### **Definition:**

Honeyclients are active security devices in search of malicious servers that attack clients. The honeyclient poses as a client and interacts with the server to examine whether an attack has occurred.

Source:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client\_honeypot\_/\_honeyclient







# What is a Honeyclient ? (II)

Different honeyclients depending on level of interaction:

- 4. Low interaction honeyclients
- 5. High interaction honeyclients







# **Low Interaction Honeyclient**

- Light weight or simulated clients (web crawler)
- Identifies known attacks based on:
  - Static analyses
  - Signatures
- May fail to emulate vulnerabilities in client applications
- Tools:
  - HoneyC
  - SpyBye
  - PhoneyC







# **High Interaction Honeyclient**

- Fully functional operating system with vulnerable applications (browsers, plugins)
- Detection of known/unknown attacks via comparison of different states (before and after visit of a server)
- Slow & prone to detection evasion
- Tools:
  - Capture-HPC
  - MITRE Honeyclient
  - HoneyMonkey







# Malicious servers (I)

### Drive-by download

- Download of malware without knowledge of the user
- Malware offered and executed through exploitation of (multiple) vulnerabilities in a browser, plugin, etc
- Specific targeted based on browser (IE/Firefox),
   JVM versions, patch level operating system









## Malicious servers (II)

### Code obfuscation

- Hide the exploit-vector
- Evasion of signature-based detection
   (AV products, Intrusion Detection Systems)
- Examples seen for Javascript, VBScript

```
function xor_str(plain_str, xor_key) {
   var xored_str = "";
   for (var i = 0 ; i < plain_str.length; ++i)
        xored_str += String.fromCharCode(xor_key ^ plain_str.charCodeAt(i));
   return xored_str;
}
var plain_str =
"\xf6\xdb\xdc\xdb\xdc\xa0\xb7\xa4....\xff\xed\xdb\xdc\xdb\xdc";
var xored_str = xor_str(plain_str, 214);
eval(xored_str);</pre>
```








# Malicious servers (III)

Exploits imported from other servers via iframes, redirects, Javascript client side redirects



#### Source:

http://www.honeynet.org/papers/mws/KYE-Malicious\_Web\_Servers.htm







# **Honeyclient project - Why?**

- Number of browser exploits increased last years
- Better understanding client side threats
- Existing tools lack in:
  - Integration & management
  - Stability & maturity
  - Limited heuristics
  - Stealth technology
  - Self-learning
- Provide a service to constituents/customers







### Goal

- Detect, identify and describe threats that infect computers through Web browser technology, such as:
  - Browser (0)-day exploits
  - Malware offered via drive-by-downloads








### **Project status**


- Completed functional & technical requirements
- Organized project management
- Frequent meetings face-2-face & videoconference
- Started software development September 2007
- 1st Milestone of software developed & currently tested
- Development 2<sup>nd</sup> Milestone started
- Project will be finished first quarter 2009


















### **Technical concept**










### **Import layer**









## **Import layer**


- URLs (aka objects) report to the import layer via agents (scripts)
- URLs prioritized depending on importance / origin (configurable)
- Contracted URLs:
  - Important URLs which need to be checked frequently (sites of constituents / customers)
- Web form:
  - Manual submission of URLs
- Loose crawler:
  - URLs from {Google|Yahoo}-queries







## Filter layer









# Filter layer


- Filter URLs which are:
  - Already analyzed
  - Not active (domain or IP unreachable)
- Applies on URLs from every source, except contracted URLs
- Black list filter:
  - URLs identified as malicious
  - Hit count & TTL on URL
- White list filter:
  - URLs identified as benign
  - Hit count & TTL on URL (or permanent listed)







### **Analysis layer**









## Low interaction component (I)


- Webcrawler (Heritrix)
- Proxy (Spybye) with ClamAV
- Snort IDS
- Pcap dumps
- Extensions:
  - Rhino (JavaScript engine)
    - -> Javascript de-obfuscation
  - Heuristics
    - -> Identify obfuscated & malicious JavaScripts







### Low interaction component (II)









# Low interaction component (III)

### Heuristics

Currently used to identify obfuscated JavaScripts. In the future also used to identify obfuscated VBScripts and to classify websites (*benign*, *suspicious*, *malicious*).

### Current implemented heuristics

- Weka Classifiers (machine learning techniques)
- JSAdvancedEngineDetection
- JSIterationCounter
- JSExecutionTimeout
- JSOutOfMemoryError







## Low interaction component (IV)

- Heuristics under research
   Detect malicious web content the same way as detection of spam.
- Most promising heuristics
  - Naïve Bayes
     (good test results, undergoing further testing 'in the wild')







# High interaction component (I)

- Based on Capture-HPC
- Multiple patch levels Microsoft Windows
- IE / Firefox (possibly plugins, like QuickTime & Flash)
- Checks for:
  - Started or terminated processes
  - Filesystem modifications
  - Registry modifications
- Proxy (Spybye) with ClamAV
- Snort IDS
- Pcap dumps










## High interaction component (II)









# **External analysis**

- Submission of a binary file or URL to external sources
- Results are stored in a database
- Plugins for:
  - VirusTotal
  - Anubis
  - Norman Sandbox
  - CW Sandbox
  - Stopbadware







# And more analysis...

### URL Localizer

- ASN
- Name of the ISP
- Country

### Active checker


- Check if domain still resolves
- Check if server is active







## **Management layer**









### Management layer

### Objects tagging

- Confidence level
- Priority level
- Process classification
- Alert classification

### Queue manager

- Manages the main object-queue

### Signature manager


- Generation of signatures
- Judge quality of signatures
- Distribute signatures to {Network|AV} monitor







### **Presentation layer**









## **Presentation layer**

- Web-based GUI
- Alerter plugin
  - Sends alerts via email, SMS
- Reporter plugin
  - Creates reports (PDF) with graphical statistics and/or detailed information
- External output plugin
  - External systems can fetch results of processed objects







## Wrap up (I)

### **Honeyclients**

- ✓ Honeyclients are active security devices in search
  of malicious servers that attack clients
- ✓ Low-interaction honeyclient currently used to detect known attacks
- ✓ High-interaction honeyclient used to detect known & unknown attacks







# Wrap up (II)

### **Honeyclient project**

- √ To identify suspicious and malicious URLs
- ✓ A combination of low- & high-interaction honeyclients
- ✓ Many URLs from multiple sources processed based on importance







### Links

HoneySpider Network

http://www.honeyspider.org/

Capture HPC

https://projects.honeynet.org/capture-hpc/

• Heritrix

http://crawler.archive.org/

Weka

http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/



HONEYSPIDER network







### **Questions?**

